

























































































































































































































































































































  Agricultural laborers (000 persons)  2002  Nguyen Sinh Cuc (2003) 
  No. of households  2002  Nguyen Sinh Cuc (2003) 
  No. of agricultural households  2002  Nguyen Sinh Cuc (2003) 
Land use      





  Area of seasonal rice (000 ha)  1995‐2006  GSO 












  Production of tea  1995‐2002  Nguyen Sinh Cuc (2003) 
Forestry     
  Total forestry land (000 ha)  2005‐2006  GSO 
  Natural forestry land (000 ha)   2005‐2006  GSO 
  Planted forestry land (000 ha)  2005‐2006  GSO 
Animals     
  No. of buffalo  1995‐2006  GSO 
  No. of cattle  1995‐2006  GSO 
  No. of pigs  1995‐2006  GSO 
  Poultry  1995‐2006  GSO 
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In most upper-catchments of the Northern provinces of Vietnam current land uses are producing 
negative externalities that affect downstream areas. Slash-and-burn is often blamed as the main 
cause for the problem.  
 
Land uses that would bring about environmental benefits include tree-based land use alternatives and 
agro-ecological practices (e.g. direct-seeded mulching cropping systems). However, the 
environmental services these alternative land uses would provide are un-rewarded. Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES) schemes present a new approach that focuses on creating a conditional 
benefit transfer between the upland providers of environmental services and the downstream 
beneficiaries.  
 
Agricultural households in upper-catchments have unequal access to natural resources, inducing 
contrasted farming practices and livelihood strategies. Our main objective was to evaluate the 
response of contrasted households to PES schemes that would reward them when they set aside 
some land for forestry projects. We looked at the specificity of PES schemes targeted at agricultural 
households of the upper-catchments in Northern Vietnam.  
 
Based on farm typologies developed earlier and using a simplified farm model, we analyzed how 
households with different endowments would respond to such PES schemes.  
 
MEDIA GRAB  
Access to irrigated land instrumental for reducing poverty and erosion for poor farmers of Northern 
provinces of Vietnam 
Introduction 
In most upper-catchments of the Northern provinces of Vietnam current land uses are producing 
negative externalities that affect downstream areas. Slash-and-burn is often blamed as the main 
cause for the problem. New land uses that would bring about environmental benefits include tree-
based land use alternatives and agro-ecological practices (e.g. direct-seeded mulching cropping 
systems). However, the environmental services these alternative land uses would provide are un-
rewarded. Payments for Environmental Services (PES) schemes present a new approach that focuses 
on creating a conditional benefit transfer between the upland providers of environmental services and 
the downstream beneficiaries (Pagiola and Platais 2002; Wunder 2005).  
 
The past few years have witnessed a surge of interest in the development of PES schemes in Asia. In 
Vietnam, while some projects using the conceptual framework of PES are being initiated in the central 
and southern part of the country (e.g. WWF 2007), no PES schemes are currently being implemented 
in the upper catchment areas of Northern Vietnam (Wunder, Bui Dung The, and Ibarra 2005). 
However, the Vietnamese Government expressed recently its interest in starting such a scheme to 
protect fragile upper-catchments whose degradations are causing problems, among others, on hydro-
electric infrastructures. 
 
Agricultural households in upper-catchments have unequal access to natural resources, inducing 
contrasted farming practices and livelihood strategies (Do Anh Tai et al. 2007). Our main objective 
was to evaluate the response of contrasted households to PES schemes that would reward them when 
they set aside some land for forestry projects. While some analytical work has already given general 
results (Zilberman, Lipper, and McCarthy 2006), we looked at the specificity of PES schemes targeted 
at agricultural households of the upper-catchments in Northern Vietnam.  
 
A large diversity of situations in the upper-catchments of Vietnam 
Mountainous provinces of Vietnam contain huge ecological and economic heterogeneity. In upper-
catchments areas, household livelihoods are influenced by major driving forces such as the type of 
land they have access to, the amount of water they can capture for irrigation, and the markets they 
have access to. Household surveys conducted in Yen Bai province in 2006 and 2007 were used to 
build a generic typology of upland farmers to relate the differences in resource endowments and their 
livelihood strategies.  
 
The first and main differentiating factor was the combined access to land and water. Results showed 
that land well-suited for growing paddies was unevenly distributed between households. For the 
typology construction, two types of access to land and water were defined: (1) households with 
sloping rainfed land only, (2) households with sloping rainfed land and access to water flows allowing 
the production of one or two paddy crops per year. The second differentiating factor is the household 
access to markets (inputs, outputs, and off-farm). Large differences were found between the 
communities access to markets. Distance to main markets gives one explanation. Many households 
were also excluded from markets because of previous bad experiences such as defaults on previous 
credits. On the latter, participation to input/output markets were also found to be highly variable 
between households of the same community. 
 
Based on these factors, we classified the households in four categories (Table 1). Of the four groups 
identified, types 1 and 3 households are the poorest in terms of income generation and also the most 
vulnerable over time. Both have a limited access to markets, but they are contrasted by their access 
to irrigated land. For the remaining of this paper, we will therefore concentrate on the impact of the 
PES scheme on these two groups.  Type 1 farmers do not have land suitable for growing paddy rice. 
Hence they cultivate only more fragile sloping lands for their food needs. Shifting-cultivation rice 
based systems are used. With low availability of land per capita, shifting cultivation is practiced with 
short fallow periods, and the overall land fertility is progressively decreasing. Without access to input, 
output markets, food demand can only be met through traditional cultivation techniques (no 
fertilizers) and through food produced from their own land (no purchase of rice). Type 3 farmers have 
access to water for irrigation, but have limited access to markets. Most of the activities are 
concentrated on the production of paddy rice. Sloping areas are only cropped when the rice paddy 
production is not sufficient for household needs. In particular, when farmers can grow two rice crops 
per year, the remaining upland is usually left idle for soil fertility recovery. The fourth group does 
have access to water for irrigation and to markets.  
 
Table 1 : Simplified typology of households in upper-catchments 
Access to land and water  
Upland mainly  
(no water) 
Paddy land mainly 
(water for 2 rice crops) 
No ? Subsistence rainfed rice farming 
(18%) 
?Subsistence paddy farming (21%) Access 
to 
markets Yes ? Diversified upland growers (15%) ? Diversified production (46%) 
 
A simple model of type 1 and 3 production systems was developed and simulations were conducted to 
analyze their potential reactions to different types of PES schemes. However, modeling shifting 
cultivators is not straightforward since the model has to reproduce systems with discontinuous 
behavior over time, and cannot rely on the traditional hypotheses of income maximizing behavior and 
market integration. 
 
The specificities of our modeling approach 
Shifting cultivation systems are characterized by the use of long fallow periods alternating with short 
cultivation periods and the absence of use of external inputs. The rationale of discontinuing cultivation 
is double. First, fragile sloping soils are degrading fast and crop yields tend to fall rapidly. Second, 
invasion of weeds after few years of cultivation are causing a sharp reduction of labor productivity. 
For these subsistence oriented shifting cultivation systems, we hypothesized that a field cultivated in 
the preceding season, is given up if two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the discounted projected benefit 
stream of continued cultivation is less than the one associated with the alternative options of 
concentrating efforts on the other opened fields, or by opening a new field, and (2) the expected food 
production stream will not fall below the household minimum requirements. 
 
Since the two types of farmers modeled do not have access to markets, it was assumed that modeled 
farmers are only interested basic consumption needs. When these are met they prefer more leisure to 
higher consumption. Hence, the households’ objective is to reach a food sufficiency target with the 
minimum of labor effort, implying that consumption beyond that level has no real value (e.g. Dvorak 
1992; Angelsen 1999; Rasmussen and Møller-Jensen 1999). 
 
Most conservation decisions involve inter-temporal trade-offs. Nevertheless, most farmers with 
pressing subsistence needs have high discount rates resulting in very short planning horizons. Still, 
decisions taken at one point of time will influence future outputs and decisions. Hence, we used a 
recursive model, where households take decision annually with short-term planning horizon, but have 
to bear the consequences of their previous choices. 
 
Model structure and dynamics 
The model simulates private decisions of a farmer that has been allocated a given area of sloping land 
for individual management. It focused on three interlinked mechanisms: nutrient dynamics, cropping 
and fallow periods, and labor allocation decisions. The model is recursive dynamic and deterministic. 
It is recursive dynamic because farmers make annual decisions based on expectations over their 
planning horizons and on the actual state of the system. However, the state of the system depends 
only on the previous decisions. The following assumptions were also made: only one crop is grown, 
land available to the household is fixed, household population is constant over time, and fertility 
status of each field can be described by only one parameter.  
 
Nutrient dynamics is influenced by household decisions at each period, i.e. cropping versus fallowing, 
and labor input in each cropped plot. In return, those decisions will be conditioned by the status of 
each available fields, and household food requirements and labor constraints. Household land is 
divided into a fixed number of fields of equal size, among which a variable number is cultivated at any 
time. Fertility equations ensured that plot fertility increase at a decreasing rate during fallow periods, 
and decrease proportionally to yields during cultivation periods. Yield obtained in each plot will 
depend on its actual fertility and the labor investment. The production function ensured that yields 
increase at a decreasing rate with plot fertility and labor input. The modeled households have no 
access to markets, so it was assumed that households chose the number of fields cultivated or 
fallowed and allocated labor among cultivated lands in order to produce enough food and minimize 
labor input. The household planning horizon is one year.  
 
For each time step, we implemented the following decision process. Four strategies with respect to 
opening and abandonment of fields were defined: (1) no changes made compare to previous season, 
(2) one new field is opened and no fields abandoned, (3) one field is abandoned, (4) one new field is 
opened, and one field is abandoned. If a field is to be opened, the field with the highest fertility is 
chosen. Besides, field clearing time is added to the labor needs of this plot. If a field is to be 
abandoned, the cultivated field with the lowest fertility value is chosen. For each strategy, a decision 
model, using non-linear programming, is applied that minimize household’s labor input, while 
producing the required food and respecting the family labor constraints. If a strategy is impossible at 
a particular time, it is discarded during that loop. Farmers with access to water can also allocate labor 
to their paddy fields. Paddy fields are producing food according a specific production function. The 
strategy giving the lowest forecasted value of household labor required is retained. State variables 
are re-calculated for the next time step using the chosen strategy. This model was implemented using 
GAMS with the non-linear programming solver CONOPT2 (Drud 2006). 
 
Simulations and discussion 
Many of the mechanisms required by the model were difficult to extract from available empirical data. 
Hence, they are based on generalized empirical findings in terms of yields decrease over cultivation 
years in shifting cultivation systems and are as far as possible based on a household survey done in 
the Van Chan district, Yen Bai province in 2007.  
 
We first ran the model for base scenarios (Scenarios 1 and 3 of table 2) to reproduce the main 
phenomena observed over time in the shifting cultivation systems. In all cases, households were 
composed of 3 working adults that provided food for a total of 5 household members. The models 
were able to reproduce a cropping/fallow system quite realistically. Figure 1 shows the fertility index 
of one farm plots over the years under the different scenarios. The upward sloping part of the curves 
correspond to fallow periods, the downward sloping part of the curves correspond to cultivation 
periods. Farms without access to irrigated land (scenario 1) have a shorter cropping/fallow period of 
around 16 years, with a cultivation period of 6 to 7 years. Farms with access to irrigated land 
(scenario 3) have a longer cropping/fallow cycle of 20 years, with around 5 years of cultivation and 
the remaining time for fallow. Given the high productivity of paddy fields, fertility can be maintained 
over time in the sloping land. Different coefficients taken for the yield and fertility equations provided 
slightly different cycle length, but the same fundamental cycle was obtained, which suggests that the 
most fundamental mechanisms are represented in the model, even though real empirical coefficients 
could not be obtained. 
 
For the simulated farms with access to water, the average land fertility is decreasing only slightly over 
time suggesting that shifting-cultivation systems could be sustainable over time since enough time is 
given for soil fertility recovery. Fertility is decreasing faster for the farm without access to irrigated 
land since they have shorter fallow periods. 
 
Simulation years (t)



















Figure 1: Fertility index over time of one selected plot. Sc 1 and 3 are base scenarios. Sc 2 and 4 
correspond to a 25% reduction of cropping area in the sloping compartment of the farm. 
 
Then, we simulated the effects of an hypothetical PES scheme, where participants would receive 
monetary compensation to set-aside part of their cultivated land for reforestation (Scenario 2 and 4).  
However, given the high transaction costs these households are facing, monetary payments are 
unlikely to be easily translatable into real goods. Hence households have no other opportunities than 
to live with their new constraints, and can only reduce slightly the amount of food they expect from 
their agricultural land. To illustrate this, we simulated farmers that should reduce their cropping area 
by 25%, and that would receive monetary compensations that would reduce their food needs from 
agriculture by 10%. Other alternative PES schemes could be considered, such as monetary 
compensations for adopters of a set sustainable farming practices and are likely to produce different 
results, but actual projects of Vietnamese government in the northern part of Vietnam focused so far 
on forestry projects.  
 
For households without irrigated land, a sharp soil fertility decrease was observed over time in the 
area left for agriculture (Scenario S2 of figure 1). While protected areas are recovering progressively, 
increased degradation took place on the remaining cultivated land. With less available land to 
agriculture, households were forced to reduce the fallow periods, and to cultivate their land for longer 
periods of time. Simulation results even show that the land under cultivation does not diminish the 
proposed PES scheme (Table 2). Therefore, the overall effects on erosion transmitted to downstream 
users and dams would depend on the relative sensitivity of protected and cultivated soils to erosion. 
Table 2 : Land and water access under the different scenarios.   




Upldand area under 
cultivation after 15 years 
(ha)* 
1  (Base, Group 1) 0 3.5  1.31 
2  (Protected zone, Group 1) 0  2.62  1.31 (0%) 
3  (Base, Group 3) 0.2 3.5  0.87 
4  (Protected zone, Group 3) 0.2  2.62 0.82 (-6%) 
* Results of the simulations 
 
For households with irrigated land, the farmers are decreasing their fallowing period, but are also 
increasing the labor allocated to irrigated crop (Scenario 4) to be able to produce sufficient food for 
their needs. Cultivation area in the upland compartment is slightly reduced, and the fertility index in 
the remaining land is slightly increasing. Therefore, the reduction of available land to agriculture is 
likely to decrease the erosion created by those upstream farmers. 
 
Conclusions 
PES scheme designed to set aside land for forestry programs is likely to have very contrasted effects 
on farm households without access to markets depending on their access to irrigated land. Farmers 
with access to irrigation are more likely to participate in such PES schemes because they can 
compensate the reduction in land availability by increasing the productivity of the lowland 
compartment. In contrast, farmers without irrigated land are likely to suffer most from land set aside 
program if only monetary compensations are given. For them, participation in the scheme can only be 
compensated by cropping more intensively the non-protected zones, hence increasing the likeliness of 
erosion on these zones. 
 
For farmers without irrigation, having access to new irrigated areas to compensate for their loss in 
sloping land would be the most favorable reward. For communities that have difficult access to 
markets, funds transferred to communities in the form of irrigation infrastructure are likely to be 
more efficient both in terms of soil conservation and livelihood improvement than monetary transfers 
to individual farms for forestry projects. For example, building-up concrete canals so that more 
households have access to irrigated land is likely to produce important environmental effects by 
reducing the pressure on sloping lands. However, this kind of reward would not be conditional. 
 
The results of this simplified model are confirming the information obtained during group discussions 
with farmers in the communities where this work was conducted. Farmers have often expressed the 
need for improvement of irrigation infrastructure as a mean to improve their livelihoods, and also 
tend to see set-aside programs for forestry projects as an additional constraint to their daily life more 
than an opportunity. In contrast they showed interest in projects that would increase land 
productivity whether by getting improved access to water or by new sustainable technologies on the 
sloping lands. In the latter case, new cropping systems such as direct seeded rice or maize with cover 
mulch are often reducing incomes in the first years of adoption (Affholder et al. 2008). Alternative 
PES scheme that would provide some compensations conditioned to the adoption of such technologies 
are also likely to meet interest from farmers.  
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Northern provinces of Vietnam suffer from 
environmental problems such as deforestation, 
soil degradation, and loss of biodiversity. As a 
result, the livelihoods of most agricultural 
households are unsustainable. Moreover, the 
current land use practices are also producing 
negative externalities that adversely affect the 
downstream areas.  
Deforestation and slash-and-burn cultivation 
techniques are blamed by some governmental 
organizations as the main causes for the 
problem. A mix of incentives (generally 
subsidies), technical assistance (usually 
improved and sustainable agricultural practices), 
and regulation have been used to address the 
problem. While some progress can be observed 
in terms of reforestation, many agricultural 
households are still employing unsustainable 
agricultural practices that will in the medium 
term affect their own livelihoods. Land use 
practices, which would bring about 
environmental benefits, include forest 
plantation, agro-forestry, tree-based land use 
alternatives and agro-ecologically sound 
practices such as conservation agriculture 
(Gouyon, 2002). However, the environmental 
services these land use provide, i.e. watershed 
services, biodiversity conservation and carbon 
storage are usually un-rewarded and only 
indirectly connected to economic activities (Bui 
Dung The et al., 2004). 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) 
schemes present a new approach that focuses 
directly on creating a conditional benefit 
transfer between the upland providers of 
environmental services and the downstream 
beneficiaries. Such schemes can take the 
advantage of upland-lowland interactions in 
generating environmental benefits while 
improving the livelihoods of upland farmers. 
The past few years have witnessed a surge of 
interest in the development of PES schemes in 
Asia. In Vietnam, while some projects using the 
conceptual framework of PES are being 
initiated in the central and southern part of the 
country (e.g. WWF, 2007), no PES schemes are 
currently being implemented in the upper 
catchment areas of Northern Vietnam (Wunder 
et al., 2005). However, the Vietnamese 
Government expressed recently its intention to 
start such a scheme to protect fragile upper-
catchments whose degradation is causing 
problems on hydro-electric infrastructures. 
Households in upper-catchments have unequal 
access to natural resources. The upper-
catchments are generally composed of narrow 
valley bottoms, where irrigated rice fields are 
found and surrounding sloping land where 
upland rice, maize and cassava are the principal 
crops. The differential access to these two types 
of land has some important consequences on 
household farming practices and livelihood 
strategies. 
The main objective of this paper is to review the 
potential responses of the different types of 
households to a PES scheme that would reward 
farmers to set aside some land for forestry 
projects. Subsequently, we will investigate if 
poorly endowed farmers would gain from 
participating in such a scheme. While, some 
analytical work has already given general 
results (Zilberman et al., 2006), we would look 
at the specificity of PES schemes targeted at 
agricultural households of the upper-catchments 
in Northern Vietnam.  
The proposed paper is organized in two parts. 
The first part proposes a typology of farmers of 
two typical upper-catchments of the northern 
province of Yen Bai, Vietnam. The second, 
using a simplified farm model analyses how 
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households with different endowments would 
respond to such a PES scheme.  
The Sai Luong and the Pan Cang catchments 
were selected for their contrasted water 
availability and access to markets. The villagers 
of the Sai Luong catchment, in Nam Bung 
commune, share a relatively large area of flat 
valley bottom where rice paddies are grown. 
Most farmers do not have access to the input or 
output markets. On the other hand, the villagers 
of the Pang Cang catchment, in Suoi Giang 
commune, have only access to sloping land. 
They are now increasingly making use of water 
runoffs by constructing irrigated terraces along 
the slopes. Farmers have access to input and 
output markets and are actively marketing their 
agricultural products such as tea, maize and 
cassava. Participatory exercises were conducted 
to elicit the rules that govern access of 
households to land and water resources. 
Household surveys results were used to build a 
typology of farmers to relate the differences in 
resource endowments to livelihood strategies 
and actual agricultural practices.  
Results showed that land well-suited for 
growing paddies, i.e. bottom-valley paddies or 
terraces established on the sloping areas, is 
unevenly distributed between households. First, 
not all bottom-valley plots have access to water 
during the spring season even if water is 
abundant in the catchment. As a result, a large 
proportion of villagers cannot grow rice during 
that season, while others can grow two rice 
crops per year. Second, households also have 
unequal opportunities to build irrigated terraces 
on the sloping areas. These terraces collect 
water from very small streams or runoffs. When 
constructing a new terrace, households have to 
find a source of water that is not already used to 
irrigate terraces built by other households (“first 
come / first served” rule). As a result, 
households that were allocated land bordering 
streams, and already built terraces tend to block 
construction of terraces by other households, or 
force them to search water further away, 
therefore increasing these new terraces 
constructing costs. This inequity in access to 
water contributes to unsustainable use of 
sloping land. Households with limited access to 
water have to grow rice and other food crops on 
steep sloping land to meet their food needs.  
We used farm models to analyse the potential 
impact of the PES scheme on the different farm 
types. For this paper, we specifically studied the 
impact on the poorest agricultural households of 
the catchment, i.e. with poor access to markets 
and water. Based on fundamental mechanisms 
of upland cultivation, a simple model was 
formulated, focusing on the flow of nutrients, 
and in particular the use of fallow period for 
recovering nutrients, the allocation of labour 
with the purpose of satisfying subsistence needs 
and maximizing labour productivity, and the 
management of agricultural land, in particular 
the re-opening of fields after a fallow period. 
Heuristic rules have been used to express how 
farmers select between a numbers of options in 
order to obtain their goals. Finally, a test of the 
response of the model to a hypothetical PES 
scheme is carried out.  
The first results showed that farmers with little 
paddy land are not likely to gain from a PES 
scheme where some land should be set aside. If 
the PES scheme is imposed upon them, then the 
reduction of the cropping area would force them 
to reduce their fallow period. Land degradation 
would then increase in the remaining cropping 
areas. Protection of one part of the catchment 
will provoke higher degradation rates in other 
parts of the catchment. 
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– Receivers should pay
– Providers should be compensated
(Market) mechanisms to internalize 
externalities 
– Otherwise, low supply of “services”
Not specifically targeted towards poor
5PES in Vietnam
Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) : Tax on 
electricity for forestry schemes?
MARD:  guidelines for quantifying payments for 
watershed protection
Pilot payment scheme for forest environmental 
services in Lam Dong (south) and Son La (north) 
under study. 
International organizations and NGOs
6Objective
Potential response of differentiated households
PES :  Reward farmers that set aside some land 
in environmentally sensitive areas for forestry
Diversity of households 
? diversity of responses
?modeling
Impact on the poorest?
7Diversity of households
Access to land and water
Upland mainly 
(no water)
Paddy land mainly 














8One problem, different causes?
Type 1: farmers « forced » to use more 
agricultural land 
– Upland rice on slopes
Type 3: Sustainable when enough water 
Type 2 & 4: market conditions create incentives 
to use more agricultural land: 
– Maize in Son La




– Objective function (  full belly … income optimizers)
– Bounded resources (no real open access)
– Dynamic (limited horizon), recursive
Upland compartment: « Shifting cultivation »
– Discrete decisions -> open/close fields (heuristic rule)
– Fertility dynamics equations
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Direct payment may not be useful for poorest
– High transaction costs: Monetary rewards are unlikely to be 
attractive to household badly connected to markets. 
Participation might:
– ? Protect some part of the catchment
– ? Increase problems in other parts through crop intensification 
of remaining zones (reduction of fallow periods) 
Alternative rewards worked out better
– Food sufficiency is the main problem
Direct food supply
Insurance against food shortage







– Land and water endowment
Different technical alternatives
– Conservation agriculture instead of set-aside
Better integrate agronomic data through 
inter-disciplinary work
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In Asia, there is a surge of interest in the development of Payments for Environmental 
Services (PES) programs. They represent a new approach that focuses directly on 
creating a conditional benefit transfer between providers and beneficiaries of 
environmental services. More specifically, in Vietnam, a Fund for the Protection and 
Development of Forestry has been recently established that puts in place the 
mechanisms for the payment of fees by downstream users of watershed services to 
finance forestry projects in the upper-catchments. This paper reviews the potential 
response of upland farming households to a PES scheme that rewards them to set aside 
part of land for the production of environmental services. We examine the viability of 
PES schemes targeted at agricultural households of the upper-catchments in Northern 
Vietnam. We focus our attention on households identified as the poorest in the upper-
catchment areas, i.e. those with a small endowment of productive land, limited access to 
water for irrigation, and low access to markets. We find that farmers are unlikely to 
participate in a voluntary land retirement programs unless they are ‘compensated’ for 
the loss in food production and a ‘forced’ set aside program is likely to generate an 
overall negative impact on both poverty and environmental protection.  Development 
and dissemination of improved technologies that increase food yields is a 
complementary strategy to promote environmental protection.  
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Payments for Environmental Services (PES) schemes present a new approach that 
focuses directly on creating a conditional benefit transfer between providers of 
environmental services, in this case the uplanders, and the downstream beneficiaries of 
these services. PES schemes are based on the principles that those who benefit from 
environmental services should pay for them, and that those who contribute to generating 
these services should be compensated for providing them. Hence, the approach seeks to 
create mechanisms that internalize what would otherwise be an externality(Pagiola et al. 
2008). Such schemes can take the advantage of upland-lowland interactions in 
generating environmental benefits while improving the livelihoods of upper-catchment 
agricultural households. 
 
The past few years have witnessed a surge of interest in the development of PES 
schemes in Asia (e.g. Boquiren 2004; Pattanayak 2004; Suyanto et al. 2005). In 
Vietnam, while some projects using the conceptual framework of PES are being 
initiated in the central and southern part of the country (e.g. WWF 2007), no PES 
schemes are currently being implemented in the upper catchment areas of Northern 
Vietnam (Wunder et al. 2005). However, the Vietnamese government expressed 
recently its interest in starting such a scheme to protect fragile upper-catchments whose 
degradations are causing problems, among others, on hydro-electric infrastructures. In 
particular, the Vietnamese government recently created a « Fund for the Protection and 
Development of Forestry » that puts in place the mechanisms for the payment of fees by 
downstream users of watershed services to this fund. The money collected will then be 
used to finance forestry projects in the upper-catchments. For the moment, the main 
potential payees are the hydro-power plants, and the tourism industry (Government of 
Vietnam 2008), and the main potential beneficiaries would be farming households. 
 
Deforestation and slash-and-burn cultivation techniques are often blamed as the main 
causes of land degradation and deforestation in upper-catchments. A mix of incentives 
(subsidies), technical assistance on improved and sustainable agricultural practices, and 
regulation have been used to address the problem. However, such practices have not 
been widely adopted by farmers. In an attempt to meet their short-term livelihood needs, 
many agricultural households are still employing agricultural practices that are 
unsustainable in the long term. Land use practices, which would bring about 
environmental benefits, include forest plantation, agro-forestry systems, tree-based land 
use alternatives, and agro-ecologically sound practices such as conservation agriculture 
(Gouyon 2002). However, the environmental services these land use practices provide, 
i.e. watershed services, biodiversity conservation and carbon storage are usually un-
rewarded and only indirectly connected to economic activities (The et al. 2004). 
  
Agricultural households in upper-catchments have unequal access to natural resources. 
The upper-catchments are generally composed of narrow valley bottoms where irrigated 
rice fields are found and of surrounding sloping land where upland rice, maize and 
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cassava are the principal crops. Forested areas are scattered on the sloping land and are 
now usually found at large distances from villages. The differential access to these land 
resources is an important determinant of household farming practices and livelihood 
strategies. 
 
The main objective of this paper is to review the potential response of upland 
households to a PES scheme that rewards them to set aside part of land for the 
production of environmental services.  
 
In the first section of this paper, we review briefly the economic literature on PES and 
their potential impact on poverty. This review focuses on papers that unveil the 
possibility of negative impact on poor farming households that can not participate as 
service providers in potential PES program. Given the possibility of negative impacts, 
we propose a framework to evaluate ex-ante the response of poor farming households in 
the Northern provinces of Vietnam. The second section describes the study area and the 
current farming systems. Then we propose a stylised typology of farming households in 
that region. In the third section of the paper, we develop a farm household model, and 
show how it can be used to anticipate farmers’ participation in potential PES programs 
and impact on their production strategy. Finally, in the fourth section, we examine the 
likely viability of PES schemes targeted at agricultural households of the upper-
catchments in Northern Vietnam. We focus our attention on households identified as the 
poorest in the upper-catchment areas, i.e. those with a small endowment of productive 
land, limited access to water for irrigation, and low access to markets. We find that 
farmers are unlikely to participate in a voluntary land retirement program unless they 
are ‘compensated’ for the loss in food production through in-kind grain transfers or 
through the promotion of technologies that increase food yields. 
 
PES AND POVERTY 
 
PES approach was initially conceptualized and undertaken as a mechanism to improve 
the efficiency of natural resource management, and not really as a mechanism for 
poverty reduction (Pagiola et al. 2005). However, the recent attractiveness of PES to 
policy-makers is that both environmental degradation and rural poverty in upper-
catchments may be mitigated by this approach (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002).  
 
However, some authors have also warned that the impact of PES programs on poverty 
may not always be positive (Wunder 2005). Land and labour market conditions can 
affect both participants and non-participants of PES programs. First, with insecure 
tenure, poor households in target areas may be evicted by powerful groups willing to 
capture the increased value of previously marginal land (Landell-Mills and Porras 
2002). Second, PES schemes may have a positive impact on those who participate but a 
negative impact on poor households that are unable to participate, or on poor 
consumers. For example, a PES program that limits access to forested land may also 
exacerbate problems of landless households and herders, whose livelihoods depend 
crucially on gathering forest products (Kerr 2002). Third, PES can have a negative 
impact on farmers with small land area who derive most of their incomes as agricultural 
wage labour (Zilberman et al. 2008). Fourth, PES does not always result in poverty 
reduction as targeted poor households may be unwilling to participate if PES payments 
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do not cover the opportunity costs of requested land-use adjustments (Wunder 2008). 
Finally, the targeted producers of environmental services may be unable to participate in 
the PES program because of insecure land tenure, lack of land title, small farm holdings, 
or lack of access to credit to undertake investments such as reforestation (Pagiola et al. 
2005; Grieg-Gran et al. 2005). 
 
This paper concentrates on the viability of participation of upland farming households 
in PES programs. An ex-ante analysis of the potential behaviour of farmers is proposed 
that takes into account their resource endowments, income levels and livelihood 
strategies. The focus of the paper is on households identified as the poorest in the upper-
catchment areas, i.e. those with a small endowment of productive land, limited access to 
water for irrigation, and low access to markets. The specific policy intervention 
considered is a set-aside program that rewards farmers for retiring all or part of their 
land from food production.  
 





Most of the empirical work was conducted in the district of Van Chan of the Yen Bai 
province (Figure 1). This district, containing part of the Hoang Lien mountain range, is 
surrounded by the Red and the Black Rivers. Two communes, Nam Bung and Suoi 
Giang, have been selected for their contrasted characteristics in terms of water regimes, 
i.e. the ratio of lowland to upland areas, and access to markets. Both communes are 
situated at an average height of 900 m.a.s.l. and are populated by ethnic minorities, 
mainly Thai, Hmong and Dao. Both communes contain a large diversity of small 
catchments typical of the Northern provinces of Vietnam. 
 
Upper-catchments are composed of narrow flat valley bottoms, usually used for paddy 
production, surrounded by sloping land. Terraces are also found in higher areas of the 
catchments. These terraces are either irrigated when sufficient water flows can be 
captured, or are conducted as rainfed lowland terraces. In either ways those terraces 
allow the use of draft power, and are affecting water flows within the catchment. 
Finally, distant forested areas provide the ground for complementary food needs e.g. 
hunting, fruit collection, and other non-timber forest products (Figure 2). 
 
Agricultural households are conducting contrasted agricultural activities in those 
different compartments. In the valley bottoms, irrigated rice is cultivated continuously. 
Several rice crops are sometimes cultivated within one calendar year, depending on 
local conditions and farms constraints. Depending on their connection to markets and 
their financial constraints, farmers will use highly variable levels of external inputs such 
as hybrid rice, fertilizers and insecticides. However, for cash constrained households, 
only traditional rice varieties with no chemical inputs cropping systems are possible. On 
upper terraces, lack of water during the dry season reduces the possibilities to one 
rainfed lowland rice crop per year. However, other crops, such as maize and soybean 





Figure 1: Map of Vietnam, with indication of the study area in Yen Bai Province 
 
In contrast, agricultural activities are not continuous on the sloping land. Farmers 
alternate cultivation periods with fallow periods. In the study area, a typical cropping 
rotation will alternate eight to nine successive years of cropping with fallow. This 
sequence includes one to two years of dry-land rice cultivation, followed by two to three 
maize cropping years and several years of cassava cropping. Then, land is returned to 
fallow for several years before this cropping cycle is started again.  
 
A typology of household situations 
 
In upper-catchment areas, the major determinants of household livelihoods are land 
endowments, access to markets, and access to irrigation. Land endowments include not 
only the farm size but also the relative proportion of sloping uplands where rice is 
grown under dry-land conditions and paddy fields (such as terraced areas in lower 
slopes and valley bottoms) where rice is grown under wetland conditions. Rice grown in 
paddy fields generally produces higher yields than grown in sloping fields. For a given 
farm size, households who have a higher proportion of paddies are hence more food 
secure than those with a higher proportion of sloping uplands. In addition, those who 
meet most of their rice requirements from paddy fields are likely to grow non-food 
crops in the sloping uplands. This effect is reinforced if the lowland fields are irrigated.  
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Figure 2: A cross-section of a typical upper-catchment in the Northern mountainous 
provinces of Vietnam.  
 
Access to markets (inputs, outputs, and off-farm employment) is another important 
determinant of livelihood strategies. Production systems tend to be subsistence-oriented 
in areas with poor access to markets. Commercial production systems evolve when 
access to markets is good.  
 
Of the three main differentiating factors, the impact of access to water is mediated 
mainly through paddies where more intensive production of rice is possible when 
irrigation is available. The access to water is considered as a sub-category within the 
households with lowland plots. Hence, households can be classified into four categories 
based on the share of lowland in total farm area and access to markets (Table 1). 
 
Farmers of the first group cultivate fragile sloping lands for their food needs. Fallow-
rotation upland rice based systems are used: secondary vegetation is cut and burned, 
upland rice is cultivated for one or two seasons, followed by maize and cassava. After a 
few years of cultivation, land is left to fallow. The families usually complement food 
needs with products collected in surrounding forested areas. Food productivity tends to 
decline over time as land use is intensified (or fallow cycle is reduced) in response to 
rising population pressure.  
 
Good access to markets offers the second group of farmers, who basically face the same 
constraints as the first group, more choices in their livelihood strategies. Off-farm work 
allows them to obtain monetary incomes. Purchased inputs can be used to prevent the 
decline in food productivity. Also, farmers can purchase food from the market when 
needed. The resulting environmental effects in sloping uplands tend to be positive or 
negative depending on whether farmers switch to perennial crops or intensify the land 
use in favour of annual crops. For example, the replacement of existing rice-fallow 
cultivation systems to maize-cassava continuous cropping systems for animal feed is 
likely to increase soil erosion and the associated negative externalities on downstream 
users.  
 
Of the four groups identified, farmers of group 1 tend to be the poorest and also the 
most vulnerable. Intensification of land use can take the form of reduced fallow periods 
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or encroachment to forests—both producing negative externalities in terms of the 
environmental effects. Farmers of groups 2 and 4 are also likely to create substantial 
negative externalities on downstream users, especially those that grow annual crops in 
sloping areas; yet, their livelihoods are more resilient due to the opportunities provided 
by markets or due to a higher endowment with paddies for rice production, respectively.  
 
Table 1 : Simplified typology of households in upper-catchments 
Land endowment  
Higher proportion of sloping 
upland  
Higher proportion of paddy 
land 
 
Poor ? Subsistence upland rice 
farming 
?Subsistence paddy farming  Access 
to 
markets Good ? Commercial production of 
crops for markets 
? Commercial production in 
upland with rice in paddies 
 
For the remaining part of this paper, we will therefore concentrate on the impact of the 
PES scheme on the first group of farmers. A small model of their production systems 
will be developed, and simulations will be conducted to analyze their potential reactions 
to different types of PES schemes.  
 
MODELLING LAND USE DECISIONS OF SHIFTING CULTIVATORS 
 
The model developed in this paper integrates the dynamics of soil fertility over time in a 
fallow rotation system and farmer decisions on labour allocation to farming. Shifting 
cultivation systems are characterized by alternating fallow and cropping cycles. The 
rationale for discontinuing cropping is two-fold. First, fragile sloping soils are 
degrading fast and crop yields tend to fall rapidly once the vegetation has been cleared. 
Since no external inputs are used to compensate for fertility losses, fallow periods are 
used to restore naturally the stock of nutrients in the soil. The time needed to restore soil 
fertility varies according to the climate and soil characteristics. In tropical rainforests, 
this may take 8 to 12 years (Ruthenberg 1980). Second, abandonment of fields after a 
few years of cultivation is also related to the invasion of weeds causing a sharp 
reduction of labour productivity after a few years of cropping in the absence of 
herbicide use. 
 
For these subsistence-oriented shifting cultivation systems, a field cropped in the 
preceding season is fallowed if two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the discounted projected 
benefit stream of continued cultivation, calculated over a certain period is less than the 
one associated with the alternative options of concentrating efforts on the other opened 
fields, or by opening a new field, and (2) food production does not fall below the 
household food minimum requirements. 
 
Household objectives 
Upland farmers have many objectives, often conflicting ones. Achieving food security 
and increasing household incomes are two examples of objectives. The final decision 
making depends on these multiple objectives and how the households weigh 
achievements of various objectives against each other. Theoretical models of household 
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decision making are based on the maximization of ‘subjective’ utility (Nakajima 1970). 
The objective function is often simplified for empirical modelling in terms of the 
income level achieved and food needs satisfied. Poorly-developed marketing 
infrastructure and institutions in remote uplands also force such simplifications by 
constraining the application of household economy models that consider both the 
consumption and production side together with the markets linkages (Singh et al. 1986).  
 
In the simplification used here, a household is assumed to minimize the total labour use 
in food production subject to satisfying the family food requirements. This assumption 
implies that the household is basically subsistence-oriented with very limited interaction 
with markets (Group 1 household in Table 1). In the real world, upland farmers do have 
some interactions with the market and make land/labour use decisions in the light of 
market opportunities. In fact, most farmers fall somewhere in a continuum between 
fully subsistence-oriented and fully market-oriented. Analysis based on these extreme 
scenarios, although unlikely to be observed in the real world, can help generate insights 
into the farmer behaviour as conditions approach either fully market- or fully 
subsistence-oriented production. The quantitative modelling included in this paper is 
based on the assumption of fully subsistence-oriented production.  
 
Temporal considerations 
Most conservation decisions involve inter-temporal trade-offs: immediate gains of an 
action must be balanced against associated long term losses. Nevertheless, most farmers 
with pressing subsistence needs have high discount rates, resulting in very short 
planning horizons. Still, decisions taken at one point of time will influence future 
outputs and decisions. Hence, we used a recursive model, where households take 
decisions annually with short-term planning horizon, but have to bear the consequences 
of their previous choices. 
 
Model structure and dynamics 
Farmers make a number of decisions that are potentially relevant for the management of 
natural resources: cropping and fallow periods, crop choice, labour and other inputs, soil 
conservation investments, etc. We focused on three main interlinked mechanisms: 
nutrient dynamics, cropping and fallow periods, and labour allocation decision.  
 
The model reproduces decisions of a farmer who has been allocated a given area of 
sloping land for individual management.  
 
The following additional assumptions were also made: 
• Land available to the household is fixed. Therefore, expansion of agricultural 
activities into open-access forest is not an option as is the case in Vietnam. 
• Food requirements and labour supply are time invariant.  
• It is assumed that the fertility status of each field f at period t can be described by 
only one parameter FERT(f, t). This implies that one single nutrient is assumed to be 
globally limiting the production. 
 
Nutrient dynamics and crop yields are influenced by household decisions at each period, 
i.e. cropping versus fallowing, and the quantity of labour input into crop production. In 
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return, those decisions will be conditioned by the fertility status of fields, household 
food requirements and labour constraints. 
 
Nutrient dynamics  
Household land is divided into a fixed number of fields of equal size, among which a 
variable number is cultivated at any time. The field fertility approaches asymptotically a 
maximum level when the field is left fallow, and decreases proportionally when the 
field is cropped. Similar formulation has been used in resource use problems (Van 
Noordwijk 2002). 
 
During fallow periods, the fertility of each field, FERT(f,t), is updated for each time step 
by assuming that nutrients are re-generated at a rate depending on the initial fertility 
















Equation 1 ensures that the fertility of a given field in the next period is determined as 
the sum of its current fertility, plus a second term expressing the accumulation of fallow 
vegetation in the field, and in the soil. Equation 1, through the coefficient α1 and α2, 
ensures that large fertility increases are possible if the fertility is far below its maximum 
level fertM, and that fertility increases are decreasing as FERT approaches fertM.  
 
During cultivation periods, fertility of the field decreases when it is cultivated. The 
fertility decrease is assumed to be proportional to crop yields during the season 
(equation 2) 
 
 ),(.),()1,( 3 tfYIELDtfFERTtfFERT α−=+  (2) 
where α3 determined the fertility decrease per ton of obtained yield. 
 
Land productivity 
Yield obtained in each fields depends on its initial fertility and the labour use. Yield will 
increase asymptotically towards a yield ceiling Y0(t) as field fertility or labour input per 
unit area LAB(f,t) increase. The achievable yield is also assumed to be decreasing with 
















This production function ensures that marginal productivities of fertility and labour 
inputs are decreasing, and can be considered to be a continuous version of the von-
Liebig production function (Paris and Knapp 1989; Paris 1992). 
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Land use and labour allocation 
As discussed earlier, labour is allocated, fallowed land is brought into cultivation and 
cultivated land is left fallow according to household decision rules involving factors 
such as household labour productivity and food sufficiency. The modelled households 
have no access to markets, so it was assumed that households choose the number of 
fields cultivated or left fallow and allocate labour among cultivated lands in order to 
produce enough food.  
 
For each year, decisions about the number of plots cropped and the labour allocated in 
each of the cropped plot are simulated according the following process. 
 
Construction of scenarios on which plots should be cropped / left fallow:  
Four scenarios are built: (1) the household cultivates the same plots that was cultivated 
in the previous year, (2) the household cultivates one new plot and do not leave any of 
the cropped ones fallow, (3) one of the cropped plots is left fallow (4) one plot under 
fallow is cropped, and one cropped plot is left fallow. The plot with the highest value of 
FERT(f,t) is chosen as the newly cropped plot and clearing time (opening(t)) is added to 
the labour needs. The cropped field with the lowest value of FERT(f,t) is chosen as the 
plot newly left fallow.  
 
Identification of the most favourable scenario 
For each scenario, a non-linear programming model is used to minimize the household’s 
labour input, while producing the required food (equation 4) and respecting the family 
labour constraints (equation 5). For each scenario, the model obtains the allocation of 
labour to each of the cropped field under that scenario. This model is implemented 














o LAB(f,t) is labour allocated to field f (endogenous); 
o flab(t) is the household available labour time. 
 
The best scenario is retained and represents the decision taken during the year t.  
 
Implementation of the decisions and step forward to the next year 
Finally, the soil fertility index of each plot is re-calculated for the next time step under 
that scenario.  
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Base simulation settings and model behaviour 
Empirical estimates of parameters for northern Vietnam conditions are not available. 
Parameter values assumed to initialize the model were calibrated to produce close 
resemblance with the upland rice yield trajectory generally applicable to upland 
conditions of northern Vietnam. The yield trajectory was constructed from the data 
generated from a household survey conducted in the Van Chan district, Yen Bai 
province in 2007 (Tai et al. 2007).  
 
We modelled a farm household with 4 hectares of sloping land with no access to water 
for irrigation. The household labour force comprised of three adults, with the household 
having a total of five family members. Figure 3 (baseline scenario) shows the trajectory 
of the fertility index of a selected field over the years. The upward sloping part of the 
curve corresponds to fallow periods with the downward sloping part corresponding to 
the cultivation periods. A long cropping/fallow cycle of an average of 15 years is 
obtained, with around 5 years of cultivation and the remaining time for fallow. For the 
simulated farm, the average land fertility is decreasing over time suggesting that the 
simulated fallow-rotation systems are not sustainable over time. Similar downward 
long-term trends were observed even under different parameter assumptions.  
 
Simulated Years

















25% Set aside 
 
Figure 3: Nutrient status over time of one field under base and set-aside scenarios 
 
IMPACT OF PROPOSED PES SCHEMES 
 
The model was used to analyze the impact of policy that would reduce the sloping land 
available for farming for the benefit of forested area. A ‘set-aside’ program basically 
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reduces the land area available for use and is simulated by a reduced farm size, with 
other things remaining the same.  
 
To simulate this scenario, we reduced the cropping area by 1 ha. A sharp decrease of 
soil fertility was observed over time in the area left for cropping. With less available 
land to agriculture, households were forced to reduce the fallow periods, and to cultivate 
their land for longer periods of time (see scenarios -25% of Figure 3). There is an 
overall decrease in the overall average fertility status (averaged between cropped and 
fallowed land) despite an improvement in the fertility status of the land taken out from 
crop production over time (Figure 4). 
 
When considering the average effects of the scheme over a 20-year period with the 
current simulation coefficients, the impact on the average fertility of land (Table 2) is 
almost the same between the base scenario (no PES), and the scenario with PES (-9.5% 
versus -10.2%). 
 
Table 2 : Variation of the average fertility index over a period of 20 years with a 25% 
reduction of cropping area without compensation 
 Base scenario With 25% reduction of upland cropping area 
Year Average Cultivated area Protected area Weighted 
average 
1 89.2 88.7 88.0 88.6 
20 80.8 69.7 108.9 79.5 
% Variation -9.5% -21.4% 23.8% -10.2% 
 
This result indicates that the overall environmental effects may well be negative over 
time since degradation is more likely to be shifted than really stopped. Besides the 
overall impact on farmers livelihood is negative since they have to use more labour to 




























25% reduction of upland cropping area - Cultivated area
25% reduction of upland cropping area - Protected zone
25% reduction of upland cropping area - Total area
 
Figure 4: Impact on average plot fertility of a 25% reduction of cropping area without 
compensation.  
  
A mechanism for ensuring that households are able to meet their food needs is to 
compensate them for the lost food production resulting from the withdrawal of land. A 
sustainable land fertility status can be achieved by compensating farmers in the form of 
direct provision part of their food requirements. Such a provision may take the form of 
annual in-kind subsidy of grain. This mechanism was used by China’s Sloping Land 
Conversion Program that compensated farmers who converted degraded land to forests 
(Bennett and Xu 2005). It has to be noted, however, that the cost of making such 
transfers may be too high in remote areas to make it a viable strategy except for some 
limited areas.  
 
Another solution would be to act upon farmers’ risk induced behaviours. As a matter of 
fact, households’ food requirements include a “buffer surplus” to be prepared for a bad 
climatic event or pest outbreaks. An in-kind insurance mechanism that would ensure a 
minimum grain supply during the low yield years is likely to increase the households’ 
well-being (by decreasing their vulnerability). Also, food transfers involved are likely to 
be less costly as they are limited to adverse years only. Nevertheless, the total cost will 
be substantial unless the program is limited to only a small area.  
 
An effective and viable strategy to promote set-aside of land is to increase the yield per 
unit of agricultural land through the public provision of improved agricultural 
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technologies. Pressure to intensify land use can be reduced if crop yields are higher as 
farmers will be able to meet their food needs from a smaller area. The success of ‘return 
land to forest’ program in the uplands of Yunnan, China is partly due to the availability 
of high yielding upland rice technologies (Pandey et al. 2005). In addition, such 
technologies help promote income generation by releasing resources (land and labour) 
that can be used to produce market-oriented crops without sacrificing the household 
food security. Investments in agricultural R&D and technology promotion may be 
considered by rural communities as a part of broader development interventions, not a 
part of PES. Nevertheless, at the sectoral level, such investments can be seen as a 
strategy to promote environmentally beneficial changes in land use.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This article developed a recursive dynamic model of shifting cultivators that integrated 
the dynamics of soil fertility over time and farmers decisions in order to analyse the 
potential effect of their participations in PES programs. The model predicted that 
farmers are unlikely to participate in a voluntary land retirement program unless they 
are ‘compensated’ for the loss in food production through in-kind grain transfers or 
through the promotion of technologies that increase crop yields. 
 
The article also showed that if households are somehow forced into the program, 
through top-down selection of protected areas, this induces a reduction of 
environmental degradation in targeted zones, but an increase of environmental 
degradation on the remaining part of their land-holding. The overall net environmental 
effect could actually be negative. In addition, the overall effect on poverty would be 
negative since labour productivity diminishes progressively and farmers’ food supply 
becomes more insecure. 
 
This study used a simplified model of household behaviour in situations with limited 
access to markets. This forces farmers to intensify land use to meet the food 
requirement from the remaining farm area as land is set aside from agricultural 
production. An improvement in the access to markets and non-farm employment 
opportunities can relax this constraint by enhancing farmers’ overall food entitlements 
even when production accounts for only a part of the total requirements. 
Environmentally beneficial land use patterns can evolve in a commercially-oriented 
system if property rights to land are well-defined (Pandey and Lapar 1998). Voluntary 
participation in PES schemes is also more likely when food entitlements can be 
enhanced through market participation.  
 
Second, we have not studied the possibility of technological change that could be 
induced by a PES scheme. Technical solutions such as direct-seeding over mulch 
cropping systems (DMC) are potential alternatives to slash and burn practices for land-
constrained farm households of the upper-catchments (Husson et al. 2000). When 
adopted, these technologies can generate positive externalities to downstream users 
through erosion control. However, a recent study carried out in Northern provinces of 
Vietnam shows that the adoption of these DMC systems is not immediately profitable 
for farming households (Affholder et al. 2008). Compensating farmers for the transition 
costs linked to the adoption of this new technology could potentially be very effective.  
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More generally, support to development and dissemination of improved technologies 
that raise land productivity is an important strategy to reduce the intensification pressure 
in fragile and to prevent environmental degradation. Such technologies could be 
considered as part of the larger schemes for encouraging farmers to adopt 
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